

UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA

WORKING PAPER

**WHY DO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES
LAST LONGER THAN PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES?**

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MAY 2002

Presented at the Conference on *Globalization and Governance*, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, July 3-5, 2002.

Introduction

Parliamentary regimes last longer, considerably longer, than presidential regimes. The average age of democracies that existed in 1999 was 39 years when they were parliamentary and 23 when they were presidential. During this period, in any given year, democracies faced a 0.0238 probability of breaking down, meaning that one in every 42 democracies became authoritarian. If they were parliamentary, the probability of breakdown decreased to 0.0169 (or one in every 59); if they were presidential, the probability increased to 0.0385 (or one in every 26). The higher longevity of parliamentary democracies is a well-established fact.

In the context of what became one of the leading new institutionalist explanations in comparative politics, this fact has been commonly interpreted as providing support to the idea that the basic problem of presidential democracies was presidentialism itself. The principle of separation of powers, and everything that supposedly follows from it, it was argued, provided just the wrong kind of incentives for democracies to thrive and survive.

This explanation, which assumes several guises in the comparative literature, is simplistic, if not erroneous, in several respects. Parliamentary and presidential regimes are indeed based on different constitutional principles when it comes to government formation, and this is a central choice in any democratic constitution. However, the operation of the political system cannot be entirely derived from the mode of government formation. There are other provisions, constitutional or otherwise, that also affect the way parliamentary and presidential democracies operate. These provisions may counter some of the tendencies that we would expect to observe if we were to derive the regime's entire performance from their basic constitutional principles.

In this paper, I review recent empirical and theoretical evidence that, together, suggest we should look elsewhere if we want to understand why parliamentary democracies last longer than presidential democracies. In the next section I briefly summarize what I consider to be the main propositions of the traditional view of parliamentary and presidential regimes. I then turn to examining the evidence that bears on these propositions. I first address the impasse between executives and legislatures in parliamentary and presidential democracies. Next I discuss coalitions under the two systems, followed by a discussion of party discipline. I then turn to a discussion of the nature of the decision-making process that is supposed to be associated with each of these types of democracy. I then address some of the possible explanations for the higher longevity of parliamentary regimes over presidential regimes and conclude with a brief summary of the main points developed in the paper.

Before proceeding, let me mention a couple of caveats. First, much of the material covered in this paper comes from Cheibub (2002) and Cheibub and Limongi (2002). The reader already familiar with these pieces will find that most new insights in the present paper are to be found in sections 4 and 7, which are new. Second, throughout the paper I assume democratic regimes when I talk about presidentialism and parliamentarism. Many non-democratic regimes adopt

institutions that are formally identical to the ones we find in democratic regimes.¹ They have presidents who appoint ministers, or prime ministers who go through the motion of requesting parliamentary confidence which they may, in some occasions, even lose, although whether they will leave office is another question (Carlson 1999). Here I restrict the analysis to the cases in which governments lose power by means of competitive election. The question, thus, is whether, given that governments are democratic, adopting presidential or parliamentary institutions makes a difference for the way the regime operates.

2. Parliamentarism and presidentialism: the traditional view

The traditional view about forms of government in democratic regimes focuses on the basic constitutional difference between presidentialism and parliamentarism, that is, on the fact that the former is based on the separation of executive and legislative powers, while the latter is based on the fusion of these powers. From this fact a number of implications are derived which would explain the instability and poor policy performance of presidential democracies. Much ink has already been spilled on summaries of these arguments which, if we were to count, should probably be adding to more than two dozen.² Here I want to focus on what I consider to be the three most important ones:

(a) Parliamentary regimes generate governments that can govern because they are supported by a majority of parliament: There is, so to speak, a majoritarian imperative in parliamentarism, which follows from the very definition of parliamentary democracies.

Parliamentarism, according to this view, is a regime in which the government, in order to come to and stay in power, must enjoy the confidence of the legislature. Since these are systems in which decisions are made according to majority rule, it follows that no government under parliamentarism will exist that does not enjoy the support of a majority. Minority governments could occasionally emerge, but these would be relatively infrequent and necessarily ephemeral occurrences, which would reflect the temporary inability of the current majority to crystallize. This inability is temporary for the system contains automatic correctives for these situations: either a new government supported by a majority will be formed or, if this is not possible, new elections will be held so that such a majority may emerge.

Presidential regimes, in contrast, lack the majority imperative. But majorities also matter under presidentialism. In these systems voters have two agents who, by design, do not necessarily represent the same majority. These agents have fixed terms in office and do not depend on each other to exist. As a consequence, there is nothing in the system that guarantees that the executive will enjoy the support of the majority in the legislature. If the majority that elected the president is different from the majority that elected the

¹ See Ghandi and Przeworski (2000) for an analysis of the impact of institutions on the survival in office of authoritarian leaders.

² Linz (1994) is, of course, the seminal work, with probably the most complete list of reasons why parliamentary democracies are superior to presidential democracies.

legislature, so that the president will be supported by a minority in the legislature, there is no automatic corrective that can be applied. The most likely outcome, it is believed, is stalemate and impasse between the executive and the legislative, which can ultimately result in the collapse of the democratic regime.

(b) Parliamentary regimes foster cooperation among parties, of parties and the government, and of individual representatives and their parties: According to the traditional view, parliamentary regimes are supposed to foster cooperation. Political parties have an incentive to cooperate with one another; parties in government will support the executive, and parties out of the government will refrain from escalating conflicts due to the possibility that they may be called to govern at any time during the legislative term; individual members of parliament, in turn, will also align themselves with their parties. The end results are governments who are supported by a majority composed by highly disciplined parties, prone to cooperate with one another.

Presidentialism, on the other hand, is characterized by the absence of such incentives and hence is likely to generate governments that, even if supported by a majority, are based on parties that are not disciplined and tend to fiercely compete with each other. This view entails two distinct issues. The first issue has to do with coalition governments, that is, with the propensity that parties will have to enter into, and stay in governments. The second issue has to do with the nature of the party system and the discipline of political parties.

(c) Under parliamentarism the government controls the decision-making process and hence is able to govern: The prototypical parliamentary regime is one in which the government has a complete control over the legislative agenda and the rights of the individual members of parliament are expropriated and monopolized by the cabinet. All that individual legislators can do is to support the party line. Voters know that this is all they can do, and thus have no incentive to cast their ballot on the basis of the candidate's personal characteristics. Through the control of the legislative agenda parliamentarism would lead to party vote in the electorate and to party discipline in the parliament.

The prototype of a presidential regime, in turn, is one in which the organization of congress preserves the rights of individual representatives so that they are able to have a say on policy decisions. Separation of power is supposed to lead to independent legislators who act on the basis of their individual electoral needs; and, in response to these needs, they build personal ties with their constituencies. One is thus led to expect that legislatures in presidential regimes will have strong committee systems and representatives will be elected on the basis of the personal ties they build with their constituencies.

All these arguments converge into one overall implication: that the performance of presidential regimes, on the average and holding everything else constant, will be inferior to that of parliamentary regimes. Policies will be of lower quality (the latest formulation is that presidential

regimes will be worse at providing public goods) and this fact will reinforce the independent reasons that these regimes have to die more frequently than parliamentary regimes. Yet each of these arguments can be questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I now turn to these objections.

3. Minority Governments and Deadlock

Much of the arguments related to the impact of minority governments and deadlock in presidential regimes rest on what I consider to be a conceptual misunderstanding. For they equate *portfolio* with *policy* coalitions, failing to see that the two need not coincide, a point made informally by Strom (1990) and formally by Austen-Smith & Banks (1988), Diermeier & Merlo (2000) and Kalandrakis (2000). I will discuss this point in more detail when I address the issue of coalition formation under parliamentary and presidential regimes in section 4. For the moment, it is sufficient to say that it is simply not the case that majority governments are the expected outcome of government formation under parliamentarism. Several independent estimates indicate that this kind of government represents about one-third of governments in Western European parliamentary democracies (Strom 1990, Laver & Scholfield 1998, Cheibub 1998). Most importantly, the incidence of minority governments should not be seen as the result of system instability or failures to reach coalition agreements. Rather, they are the product of the calculus made by party leaders about the costs and benefits of participating in government, given that they are concerned not only with achieving office but also with the policies to be implemented by the government.

The argument, however, is that minority governments and deadlock are frequent in presidential regimes and that they are ultimately what causes democratic instability in these regimes. This, however, does not seem to be consistent with the available evidence.

*** Table 1 here ***

Minority governments under presidentialism, although frequent, are not as widespread as we would expect them to be on the basis of the comparative literature on presidentialism. As we can see in Table 1, 40% of the years of presidentialism between 1946 and 1996 were under minority governments, a number not far from the estimates for parliamentary regimes. These cases do not occur randomly. The frequency of minority presidential governments is associated with the number of political parties (although not in the expected way), with the type of electoral system, and with the electoral cycle (Mainwaring 1993, Jones 1995, Shugart 1995). However, the occurrence of minority governments has no impact whatsoever on the survival of presidential democracies: the probability that a presidential democracy will breakdown at any given year is almost identical for governments that control a majority of seats and those that do not.

As for deadlock, the specter that supposedly haunts presidentialism, it is neither pervasive nor is it associated with regime breakdown. Deadlock occurs only when the preferences of a majority cannot prevail. These situations depend both on the share of seats controlled by the party of the president in congress and on specific institutional features regarding the presidential veto and legislative override of the presidential veto: whether the president has veto power; the type of

congressional majority necessary to override the presidential veto; whether the system is unicameral or bicameral; and whether, in bicameral systems, veto override is by a vote in each chamber separately or in a joint session of both chambers. In combination with the share of seats held by the government, these factors allow one to distinguish three situations: presidential dominance, opposition dominance, and legislative deadlock. The latter occurs only when the president is likely to veto a bill approved by a majority in the legislature but that majority is not sufficient to override the presidential veto.

If arguments about the perils of presidentialism are correct, presidential democracies should face higher risks of dying when conditions for deadlock between the president and congress are met. Yet, as we see at the bottom of Table 1, this is not the case. The difference in the transition probabilities for deadlock and no-deadlock situations, although in favor of the former, is rather small: one in every 26 presidential democracies dies when there is deadlock, one in every 31 when there is no deadlock. This difference does not seem to warrant the level of concern with deadlock that is often expressed in the comparative literature on presidentialism. The belief that the survival prospects of presidential democracies are compromised when presidential parties lack a majority of seats in congress, or when deadlock situations exist, has no empirical basis.

An additional point has to do with the way we think of deadlock in presidential and parliamentary regimes. The conventional view is that deadlock will never occur in parliamentary regimes: whenever there is a fundamental disagreement between the government and the legislature, either the government changes or the legislature changes. Thus, the fact that in parliamentary regimes the government exists only as long as there is no alternative majority that can replace it makes them deadlock-proof.

Yet, the fact that parliamentarism includes a mechanism that can be invoked in case of policy conflict between the government and the legislative majority does not mean that this mechanism will always be invoked or, most importantly, that once invoked, it will necessarily put an end to the disagreement that led to its use. Consider the cases of Greece in 1989-1990, when it took three elections and five governments in the short space of ten months to resolve the impasse that had emerged during the Papandreou government. Or 4th Republic France, where the only stable majorities that emerged were the ones that came together to topple the current government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2002). Or post-1973 Denmark, where governments were frequently defeated on important bills and yet did not resign as a result of such defeats (Damgaard 19xx). Thus, deadlock in parliamentary regimes may also occur as governments succeed governments and no stable majority is formed even after new elections are held, or as parties allow a government to exist without being able to govern.

4. Coalitions

This is the current view about coalitions in parliamentary and presidential regimes:

- (a) Parliamentarism and presidentialism are different: the former is a system of “mutual dependence” and the latter of “mutual independence” between the executive and the legislature (Stepan and Skach 1993:17-18; Linz 1994:64; Linz and Stepan 1996:181).

- (b) Institutions shape incentives: presidentialism generates fewer or weaker incentives to form coalitions (Mainwaring 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993:20; Mainwaring and Scully 1995:33; Linz and Stepan 1996:181; Huang 1997:138).
- (c) Coalitions are difficult to form and rarely, “only exceptionally” (Linz 1994:19), do form under presidentialism (Mainwaring 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993:20; Linz and Stepan 1996:181; Huang 1997:138).
- (d) When no coalition is formed under presidentialism, a “long-term legislative impasse” ensues (Linz and Stepan 1996:186), “there is no alternative but deadlock” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:33), “the norm is conflictual government” (Jones 1995:38).
- (e) As a result, “the very notion of majority government is problematic in presidential systems without a majority party” (Huang 1997:138), “stable multi-party presidential democracy... is difficult” (Mainwaring 1990), “presidential systems which consistently fail to provide the president with sufficient legislative support are unlikely to prosper” (Jones 1995:38).

This reasoning is problematic in many respects. Most fundamentally, it assumes that the institutional differences that exist between parliamentary and presidential regimes are sufficient to create divergent incentives for coalition formation. Institutions matter and parliamentary and presidential regimes are different institutions. It does not necessarily follow that the difference in incentives will be sufficient to impede coalition formation in multi-party presidential regimes. Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2002), on whom this section is mostly based, show that the conditions for the formation of portfolio coalitions are largely similar under the two systems, and that the differences are more quantitative than qualitative.

This is how their argument works.

Assume a legislature composed of three political parties who have ideal points x^j in one single policy dimension. No party controls more than 50% of the seats.

Parties care about holding the largest possible number of government portfolios, enjoying policies that are closest to their preferences; and doing as well as possible in the next election. Thus, their utility function is:

$$V_t^j(g, x) = g_t^j - (x_t - x^j)^2 + \rho V_{t+1}^j$$

Where g = share of portfolios.

$\sum_j g^j = G$ is value for any party of holding all portfolios.

x = actual policy outcome.

V_{t+1} = continuation value.

Parties are willing to trade portfolios for policy: the utility loss associated with giving up portfolios is constant, while the marginal utility loss from increasing the distance between the ideal point of the party and the actual policy increases in this distance.

In parliamentary regimes there is a government formation protocol which stipulates that the plurality party first attempts to form a government; if it fails, the next party tries to form a government, and so on. If no government is formed, the reversion outcome occurs: new elections are held.

Following Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2002) show that the outcomes of the government formation process in parliamentary regimes will be the following:

- The reversion outcome if opposition parties expect that they will do well in the next election.
- A minority government if the policy distance between the formateur party and the second largest party is small.
- A majority coalition government if the policy distance between the formateur party and the second largest party is large.

In this analysis, the specific coalition that is formed is immaterial. The only thing that matters is that a coalition will be formed, depending on the parties' electoral prospects and their policy positions. The important point to retain is that under parliamentarism a government, any type of government, will exist only in so far as no majority wants to overturn it. There is no combination of portfolios and policy that would be better for some majority than the combination that is represented by the current government. Note, here, the distinction between portfolio and policy coalitions: in parliamentary regimes portfolio coalitions can be of any kind; if they exist, it must be because they are supported by a majority policy coalition.

Presidential regimes are obviously different. In particular, under presidentialism every government must include the party of the president, which implies that the space of feasible coalitions is smaller than under parliamentarism. In addition, the protocol for government formation is simpler: the president is always the formateur of all potential coalitions, regardless of the number of seats held by his or her party. Thus, under presidentialism, if opposition parties together control a majority of seats and want to form a common government, they cannot do it without including the party of the president. Similarly, if opposition parties in presidential regimes prefer to remain in opposition, the government may face a hostile legislative majority. Therefore, contrary to what happens under parliamentarism, in presidential systems a government without the support of a legislative majority may exist.

This much is uncontroversial and not any different from what we find in the comparative literature on presidentialism. The question that needs to be asked, however, is whether these differences are sufficient to make coalitions under presidential regimes unattractive and hence rare events. And the answer is that they are not.

Under presidentialism, what opposition parties can agree to depends on the agenda powers of the president. Presidential systems vary significantly with regard to the prerogatives of the president

in initiating and vetoing legislation. At one extreme, the US system is unique in that the president has no formal power of legislative initiative. In most presidential systems, the president can propose any legislation. At the other extreme, in some presidential systems only the president can propose the budget. When combined with veto power, these differences produce two generic situations. One in which the legislature can initiate important legislation and the president has no veto power, or the president has veto power but not enough votes to exercise it. Another in which the president has the monopoly of legislative initiative on important issues, or the president has veto power and enough votes to exercise it.

In the first situation, incentives for coalition formation will be identical to parliamentarism. The outcome, just like under parliamentarism, will depend on the differences in policy between the party of the president – the formateur – and the parties with which the party of the president may form a majority, and on the electoral prospects of the non-presidential parties. The significant difference is that the reversion outcome – now not anymore an early election, but a situation in which the party of the president keeps all the portfolios and sets policy – will never occur. Thus, just like in parliamentary systems, coalitions *will not* occur when policy differences between the party of the president and the opposition parties are small (the president will choose to let the opposition set policies and will hold on to all portfolios), or when the benefits from opposing the president are very large.

In the second situation, that is, when the legislature cannot initiate policy, all that non-presidential parties can achieve by uniting against the president is the maintenance of the status quo. In this case, the outcome will depend on the location of the status quo. One of three things will occur:

- If at least one party prefers the president's proposal over the status quo, non-presidential parties do not unite against the president and the president makes no portfolio offers. The reversion outcome in which the president's party holds all the portfolios and sets policy will occur.
- If all parties prefer the status quo over the president's proposal, and the status quo is close to the president's ideal point, the status quo prevails.
- If all parties prefer the status quo over the president's proposal, and the status quo is far from the president's ideal point, the president offers to form a portfolio coalition and the offer is accepted.

Note that only in the second of these outcomes do we observe “legislative paralysis.” This would be sufficient to make coalitions rare under presidentialism if it were true that those conditions are realized with particular frequency in these regimes. These are precisely the conditions identified by Cheibub (2002) as “deadlock situations,” which, as we saw above, occur in about one-third of the cases of presidential regimes. Moreover, to cite one more piece of evidence, of 20 Latin American democratic constitutions examined by Carey, Amorin Neto and Shugart (1997), 11 did not contain any provision regarding exclusive introduction of legislation by the executive, while the rest included partial restrictions to the legislature's ability to initiate legislation. We have no

reason, therefore, to expect that presidential regimes will be overcome by a lack of incentives for cooperation among political parties. The space of possible coalitions is, indeed, smaller than under parliamentarism; a government may exist that is not supported by a legislative majority. This makes for a lower expected level of coalition formation in presidentialism than under parliamentarism. It does not make for the absence of incentives for coalition formation. Thus, while less frequent than under parliamentarism, coalitions should not be rare under presidentialism.

Evidence is consistent with this expectation. Define a *situation* as any period of time in which the distribution of seats in the legislature remains the same. These are the cases that matter for coalition formation since they indicate the need and the opportunity for them. Between 1946 and 1999 there were 498 distinct situations under parliamentarism and 218 under presidentialism. Of these, 215 and 121, respectively, were situations in which one party held more than 50% of the seats.³ Thus, there were 283 and 97 minority situations in parliamentary and presidential regimes. Figure 1 represents the distribution of these situations according to the kind of governments they generated. We see that coalitions were formed at least some of the time in 221 situations under parliamentarism (78.1%) and in 52 under presidentialism (53.6%). Thus, although they are more frequent in parliamentary regimes, they are quite common in presidential regimes: they occur in more than half of the situations in which no party controls more than 50% of seats in the legislature.

*** Figure 1 here ***

In the framework developed by Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2002), the effect of party fragmentation on the incentives to form coalitions is indeterminate in both parliamentary and presidential systems, unless we know the distribution of party preferences. Empirically, however, they find that the frequency of coalition and majority governments actually increases significantly when no party holds more than a third of the seats in the legislature. As Table 2 shows, this pattern is identical in both systems. Thus, multiparty systems do not make coalition formation any more difficult in presidential regimes.

*** Table 2 here ***

In the current literature, I submit, the notion that presidential regimes provide no incentives for coalition formation depends both on the fact that the system is based on the principle of separation of powers and on the assumption, often implicit, that parties only care about office. The idea is that in parliamentary regimes parties support governments because if they do not, the government will fall. In presidential regimes parties do not need to support the government since the government will exist regardless of what they do. Since parties are office-seekers, they care about the big prize – the presidency – and, in order to get it, the best strategy is to always oppose the president. But when parties are assumed to have similar goals under the two regimes – this is

³ This includes *divided governments*, situations in which the majority party is not the party of the president. Although almost exclusively a U.S. peculiarity (16 of the 23 instances of divided government occurred in the United States), it also occurred in Colombia, the Philippines, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. Indeed, much of the talk about legislative deadlocks under presidentialism originates from reading or, as the case may be, misreading the United States experience (Mayhew 1991).

what Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2002) do – one finds that it is not the case that under presidentialism they have a dominant strategy, and that this strategy is to always stay out of the government when they do not control the presidency. There is no dispute here that presidential and parliamentary regimes are different; that one faces the risk of early elections whereas the other does not. What is at stake is whether this is sufficient to generate drastically different incentives for coalition formation. The answer to this, it seems to me, is negative.

Just as it is not correct to assume that the impossibility of early elections implies non-cooperation among political parties, it is nonsense to assume that the possibility of an early election will override all other considerations and always make it rational to keep the portfolio government in place. Early election is not the necessary consequence, or even the most frequent consequence, of a government dissolution in parliamentary regimes. About 30% of the elections that took place in 21 industrialized parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 1995 occurred more than a year before the expected time. Government change, in turn, does not imply early elections: 56% of the changes of prime minister, 38% of the changes in the party of the prime minister, 46% of the changes in the partisan composition of the government, and 24% of the changes in the major party in the government, were not the product of an election. The frequency of government changes in the middle of the electoral term obviously vary with the type of electoral system, the number of parties and the type of government (coalition or single party) (Cheibub 1998); but the bottom line is that elections are far from being the necessary outcome of government dissolution in parliamentary regimes and hence the costs they represent are not necessarily high and uniformly distributed across these systems. The idea that costs of coalition formation and dissolution vary across parliamentary regimes and, most importantly, are not fixed, has been forcefully developed by Mereson (1996 and 1999) in her studies of coalition formation in Italy and other countries.

Even if we grant that incentives for coalition formation are not that different under parliamentary and presidential regimes, one of the basic differences between them, namely that the president is always the formateur, may become problematic. When the president is an “outsider” with very little support in congress, the power of his or her party is magnified by the fact that that party must be a member of the government.⁴ If this is a frequent occurrence in presidential regimes, this limitation could become a serious problem.

However, it is simply not the case that presidents tend to belong to small parties or be outsiders. As Table 3 shows, the probability that the chief executive will belong to one of the two largest parties is 0.9492 in parliamentary regimes and 0.9279 in presidential regimes. Figure 2 shows

⁴ For Linz (1994), the personalized character of a presidential election makes possible, especially in the absence of a strong party system, the access to power of >outsiders.= We mean by this candidates not identified with or supported by any political party, sometimes without any governmental or even political experience, on the basis of a populist appeal often based on hostility to parties and >politicians.= (...) AOnly in a presidential system can candidates like Fujimori or Collor de Mello aspire to power@ (p.26). AIf partyless elections seem like unsound ways of assuring good government, we might ask ourselves what kind of institutional arrangements favor them or make them less likely. I would suggest that presidentialism facilitates them and that parliamentarism makes it more difficult for them to prevail@ (p.28).

that the overall distribution of seats held by the party of the president and the prime minister is similar under the two regimes. There is nothing in this distribution suggesting that presidential regimes are significantly more likely than parliamentary regimes to produce governments headed by outsiders. Furthermore, as we saw above, presidential regimes are not considerably more constrained than parliamentary regimes in the process of coalition formation. In both regimes, the government tends to be headed by the largest party, and this political factor, rather than any formal rule, seems to be sufficient to constraint the process of government formation in ways that make the two systems look alike.

*** Table 3 here ***

*** Figure 2 here ***

What are the consequences of coalition governments under the two regimes? If the cycle described by Stepan & Skach (1993) were true, presidential regimes would be less likely to survive when the party of the president does not hold a majority of seats in congress and no coalition is formed. The same should be true of parliamentary regimes. The empirical patterns, however, are complex. As [Table 4](#) indicates, parliamentary regimes do, in fact, have better chances to survive when no party obtains a majority of seats in the legislature and coalitions are formed. Presidential regimes experience the opposite situation: Although the difference is not large (life expectancies of 24.5 versus 22.6 years), the formation of coalition governments reduces survival chances when no party has >50% of the seats in congress. This, however, is not the whole story. This effect is stronger in presidentialism when the largest party holds between one third and one half of the seats. (The result is the same if instead of the seats of the largest party we use the seats of the party of the chief executive to condition the probabilities reported in the upper panel of [Table 4](#).) In these cases, the expected lifetime of the regime when coalitions are formed is 13.2 years, compared with an expected lifetime of 24.5 years when no coalitions are formed. When the largest party holds less than one third of the seats, that is, when the legislature is highly fractionalized, coalition formation sharply improves the survival chances of the regime: Expected lifetime with coalition is 54.9 years versus 23.9 when no coalitions are formed.

*** Table 4 here ***

Thus, it seems to be the level of party fractionalization that determines the effect of coalition formation on the survival of presidential democracies. When fractionalization is moderate (for instance, when the effective number of parties is between 3.5 and 4.5, as indicated in the second panel of [Table 4](#)), coalition governments are highly fragile: Their expected lifetime is <9 years, compared with 26 years when no coalitions are formed. When fractionalization increases, we find, as expected, that coalition governments increase the survival chances of presidential democracies. We saw above that in situations of high party fractionalization, coalitions are more likely to emerge in both parliamentary and presidential regimes. Now we see that, under these conditions, not only are they more frequent but they also significantly improve the chances that democracy will survive.

The reason why coalitions tend to be less frequent and detrimental to the survival of democracy when the party system is moderately fractionalized is puzzling and deserves further investigation. The third panel in [Table 4](#) presents some of the conditions that transpire under moderate and high party fractionalization and may suggest some clues. When fractionalization is moderate, the party of the president is more often the largest party, holds on average about one third of the seats, and is confronted with other legislative parties that are, themselves, relatively large. The relative strengths of legislative parties may be what makes coalition so detrimental to presidential democracies under these conditions. For the moment, however, we simply emphasize that it is *not* high party fractionalization, and the difficulties of forming majority coalitions that allegedly follow from it, that kills presidential democracies.

Thus, it is not true that incentives for coalition formation are different in presidential and parliamentary democracies. It is not true either that presidential regimes with highly fractionalized party systems make the task of coalition formation even more daunting; to the contrary, the frequency of coalition governments increases with the fractionalization of the party system in both presidential and parliamentary regimes.

5. Party Discipline

There are formal and nonformal arguments relating regime type to party discipline or cohesion in legislative vote.⁵ In the nonformal arguments, which originated with Linz and are reproduced by most critics of presidentialism, what matters is the legislators' desire to come to and remain in office. The postulate is that the threat of government dissolution and early elections is necessary and sufficient to induce party discipline. Here is how the argument works.

Under parliamentarism, undisciplined parties may mean a failure to obtain majority support in parliament, the defeat of government bills and, consequently, the fall of the government. In order to remain in government, political parties enforce discipline so that their members in parliament can be counted on to support the bills proposed by the government. Individual legislators, in turn, have an incentive to support the government in order to prevent the occurrence of early elections in which they would risk losing their positions. Under presidentialism, since the government and the legislature are independently constituted, office-seeking political parties have no reason to impose discipline on their members; their survival in office does not depend on the result of any particular vote in the legislature. Individual members of congress also lack any incentive to accept the discipline of political parties (if they were to try to impose it); voting against the party

⁵ Conceptually, party discipline and cohesion are distinct (Ozbudun 1970, Tsebelis 1995). Empirically, however, we can only observe a group of legislators voting together, either as an expression of their true preferences or as the result of disciplinary measures. As Bowler et al. (1999b) note, this distinction matters only when cohesion is moderate. If it is very high, then disciplinary measures are not necessary. If cohesion is very low, it is unlikely that such a heterogeneous group of legislators will agree to any measure that will make them vote together. Only when cohesion is high enough that a group of like-minded representatives will accept a common set of constraining rules, but low enough that they will occasionally find it in their interests to vote against the party's position, do disciplinary mechanisms become relevant. In what follows, unless explicitly noted, we treat discipline and cohesion as synonymous.

or the government would not make them any more likely to lose their mandates in early elections.

Thus, given office-seeking politicians, the fusion of power that characterizes parliamentary regimes generates incentives for individual legislators and political parties to cooperate with the government, resulting in a high level of party discipline. The separation of powers that characterizes presidentialism implies very low levels of party discipline. Even if a president were lucky enough to belong to a party that controlled a majority of seats in congress, he or she could not necessarily count on the support of that majority in order to govern. On the contrary, the president should expect, at least under some circumstances, that no support would be forthcoming from that majority.⁶

There are several problems with this argument. At the highest level of generality, the assumption on which it is based – that politicians care only about office – is not tenable. If it were true, we should never observe minority governments, since the party in charge of forming a government would always be able to lure some party into the government in order to attain a majority. Yet minority governments, as we have seen, are not infrequent in either parliamentary or presidential regimes.

At a lower level of generality, the standard argument that connects the threat of government dissolution with party discipline is inconsistent. If the argument assumes at one stage that individual legislators may gain electorally by providing specific benefits to their constituency, it denies the existence of these benefits at the next stage.

Suppose a key presidential initiative implies losses for a specific group and gains for the whole society. In the standard view, presidents have no means to induce legislators to support a proposal that removes some special privileges of a given constituency. Because legislators are office seekers, they have a clear preference for distributive policies, that is, policies that concentrate benefits on their constituencies and disperse the costs. Hence, legislators will do better if they vote against the presidential initiative and protect their constituency's narrow interests so that they will obtain its vote again in the future. They bear no costs of acting this way, and they will collect the benefits when elections are due.

The same would not occur under a parliamentary regime. An identical situation would lead to a different result. Because dissolution and early election are possible, legislators will prefer to

⁶ One of the most-noted circumstances appears near the end of the presidential term. As presidential elections near, the argument goes, members of the president's party try to distance themselves from him or her in order to avoid paying the costs associated with the government's policies. This argument neglects the possibility of circumstances in which members of the president's party do want to identify with the president in order to share in the benefits of the government's policies. Implicitly, this argument assumes that control over the government brings no electoral benefit and that presidents are not able to transfer votes for the politicians who support them. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Data on the rates of presidential reelection in the absence of term limits show that incumbency is indeed a big advantage (see, for instance, Cheibub & Przeworski 1999). Note, in addition, that the effect of forthcoming elections on support for the government, if any, should also be expected under parliamentarism (Baron 1998).

follow the party line and support the government so that they can guarantee their seats. There are costs to bear, since one may lose his or her seat. By calling (or threatening to call) an early election, the prime minister invites the electorate to judge the behavior of the legislator.

But why would a legislator who voted against the party to protect the interests of his or her constituency be punished by that same constituency? If the legislator loses the seat in early elections because his vote helped bring the government down, it must be because the number of voters who benefited from that action is not large enough to prevail electorally. If this is the case, then the legislator should know that it does not pay electorally to go against the party line and in favor of those voters. In turn, if the number of voters who benefited from the government defeat is large enough to elect a representative, then the legislator can safely defy the party line to protect them, since the legislator can expect to survive an early election.⁷ Therefore, with purely office-seeking politicians, early elections are not a credible threat that would induce party discipline.

Hence, one needs something else to argue that the threat of dissolution leads to party discipline. The standard argument includes an unstated presumption that voters in parliamentary regimes base their votes on party labels and not on individual politicians. In other words, it is presumed that under parliamentarism the electoral connection is necessarily different from the one that prevails in the US congress, as analyzed by Mayhew (1974). But whether voters vote on the basis of party labels or of legislators' personal attributes, including their willingness to defy the party to protect the interests of her constituency, is not necessarily related to the form of government.

As a matter of fact, electoral laws, and not the form of government, are usually seen as the main factor determining whether voters will vote according to personal or party attributes in a given system. In Carey & Shugart's (1994) attempt to rank electoral systems according to the kind of incentives they provide, the key factor is the control parties exercise over a politician's chances to get elected or reelected. This control, in turn, depends on the access to the ballot, the rules for transferring votes within party lists, the choices offered to vote below the party level, and the district magnitude. Parties are said to be strong and capable of enforcing discipline if these factors allow them to affect the probability that a politician will get elected.

Important as the electoral variables may be in affecting the degree of party discipline in a system, they cannot be the whole story. Electoral laws may provide the incentives for legislators to cultivate the personal vote (by seeking policies that have concentrated benefits and diffuse costs), but the decision-making process may deny them the means to do so (by centralizing decision making so that the preferences of the individual legislator are virtually irrelevant).⁸ Indeed, the

⁷ Government dissolution, in fact, is not always an undesired outcome. As Smith (1996) shows in a model of majority governments, early elections are more likely to be called when the times are good (see also Baron 1998).

⁸ Here the case of post-1988 Brazil, arguably the presidential system with the most permissive party legislation in the world, becomes relevant (Limongi & Figueiredo 1995). In any roll-call vote taken in the lower house of the Brazilian National Congress since 1988, 9 out of 10 representatives voted according to the

personal vote in the US congress is closely related to the decentralized decision-making process that characterizes its committee system (Mayhew 1974). On the other hand, as Cox (1987) demonstrated in his analysis of nineteenth-century England, a centralized decision-making process may neutralize the electoral incentives for the cultivation of the personal vote.

What matters is whether we have reasons to expect that parliamentary governments necessarily foster a higher degree of centralization in policy making. Is the process described by Cox inherent to parliamentarism? Are all presidential regimes like the one described by Mayhew? In other words, can we take the United States and England to be the paradigmatic cases of presidential and parliamentary regimes when it comes to policy making? I argue in the next section that they are not, and that we have no reasons to expect a systematic variation in the centralization of policy making between the two regimes.

Finally, some of the implications of the standard view concerning the relationship between mode of government formation and party discipline are not supported by the facts. The calculus of the individual legislator under parliamentarism cannot be solely connected with the risk of election because, as shown above, early election is not the necessary consequence, or even the most frequent consequence, of a government dissolution.

On the other hand, as far as presidentialism is concerned, the standard argument assumes that voters use their two votes independently and that representatives are judged exclusively by what they do to defend the narrow and immediate interests of their constituency. Voters do not care about their representative's role in the success or failure of the executive. If this were true, the electoral performance of the presidential party in legislative elections would be entirely dissociated from the performance of the president. Yet, considerable evidence suggests that voters do tend to associate their vote in presidential and legislative elections. This is why concurrent presidential and legislative elections would work to reduce the number of political parties competing in a given political system (Shugart & Carey 1992, Jones 1995, Shugart 1995). Hence, if voters connect their votes in presidential-legislative elections, legislators will have incentives to support the executive in some key votes. Their seats may depend on the good performance of the president.

Formal arguments linking parliamentary regimes with legislative vote cohesion have been recently developed by several authors. Huber's (1996b) spatial model of the interaction between the prime minister, the cabinet, and the prime minister's majority highlights the role of vote-of-confidence procedures in legislative outcomes. Baron (1998) and Diermeier & Feddersen (1998) use a model of legislative bargaining to show how confidence procedures that characterize parliamentary democracies affect legislative cohesion. These papers represent important advances in the understanding of the functioning of parliamentary democracies, but they do not necessarily provide a compelling argument to the effect that levels of legislative cohesion are higher in parliamentary than in presidential democracies.

recommendation of their party leaders. As Limongi & Figueiredo argue, some of this unexpected level of legislative vote cohesion must be attributed to the organizational structure of congress.

To begin with, the models proposed by Huber, on the one hand, and Baron and Diermeier & Feddersen, on the other, differ in at least one very important aspect. Whereas the latter models explicitly set up a situation entailing conflict of interests among political parties so that legislative cohesion is not a function of similarity of preferences, Huber's analysis does not. In his case, there is an area of the policy space in which the preferences of all the actors overlap, and what the model shows is that the agenda power of the prime minister will allow her to pick, in that area, the policy that she prefers. Legislators who go against the government do so in order to signal to their constituents that they are defending their interests. They do so, however, knowing that the prime minister will choose a policy that they prefer over the status quo. The contribution of Huber's model, in my view, is not to show that vote-of-confidence procedures induce high levels of party discipline in a context of conflicting preferences, but to show, as he himself notes (Huber 1996b, p. 279), that prime ministers are strategically well-positioned to obtain policies that are to their liking and that, hence, political parties are constrained in their ability to shape policies after the government is formed.⁹

Baron (1998) and Diermeier & Feddersen (1998), in contrast, explicitly model a situation in which the preferences of the party or coalition members are in conflict. The mechanism that drives their model is the control over the legislative agenda enjoyed by the parties in the government. Because agenda power guarantees future gains, and because the vote-of-confidence procedure allows the government to link the vote on a policy with the survival of the government, and, hence, to control the legislative agenda, parties and legislators may find it in their interests to vote against their preferences.

Underlying both models, as well as Huber's (1996b, p. 280), is the view of a presidential system such as the one in the United States, in which agenda-setting power lies with the legislature. However, if presidents can control the legislative agenda much in the same way as prime ministers can, then the mechanism that drives party cohesion in parliamentary regimes can also operate under presidentialism. We know, however, that the United States is exceptional in that it grants only little or no legislative and agenda powers to the president. In the majority of the existing presidential regimes presidents hold a high level of agenda and legislative powers (see Mainwaring & Shugart 1997b). The specific institutional procedure whereby this is achieved is obviously different from parliamentarism, but the end result may very well be the same.

Finally, as Diermeier & Feddersen (1998) state, confidence procedures may be a sufficient institutional feature to induce legislative vote cohesion, but they are not a necessary feature. Other mechanisms may exist, some of which are institutional (e.g., centralized legislative organization and executive agenda and legislative powers) and some of which are not. In this context, Medina's (2001) analysis is particularly relevant because it shows how legislative voting cohesion can emerge from pure congruence of preferences. His analysis demonstrates that cohesion does not necessarily depend on disciplinary measures (such as the vote of confidence) and can be obtained under any institutional set-up.

⁹ This suggests a curious, and unexpected, parallel with complaints about the limited role of political parties and the legislature in some new, presidential, democratic regimes (O'Donnell 1994). What is seen as a positive trait in parliamentary regimes takes on a negative tone when observed in presidential regimes.

Thus, it is not at all clear that the existence of cohesive legislative blocs is endogenous to the regime type. We should not presume that presidential regimes invariably generate low levels of party discipline in the legislature.

6. Centralization of the Decision-Making Process

From the constitutional point of view, all legislators, whether in presidential or parliamentary regimes, have the same rights and duties. Their mandates are the same, regardless of the number of votes they received in the electorate, their party affiliation, their degree of seniority in the legislature, and so on. Each legislator has the same right to propose legislation, to amend proposals made by others, and to participate in the process of deliberation. In addition, each legislator's vote has the same weight. In principle, therefore, legislatures are egalitarian institutions.

The reality, of course, is different. In order to manage their workload, legislatures organize themselves in a variety of ways and adopt internal rules that regulate individual legislative rights and access to resources (Kriebhel 1992, p. 2). Legislative rights and resources are not uniformly distributed. Individual legislators' chances to influence the order of business and to have a say in decision making depend on the legislative rights granted to them by the internal rules of their assembly. Hence, legislative organization affects the structure of the decision-making process and the weight of legislators in policy decisions.

Discussions of legislative organization usually make reference to the two paradigmatic cases of England and the United States: a centralized and a decentralized legislature, respectively, and, of course, a parliamentary and a presidential democracy. Most arguments about decision making in democracies contrast these two systems and assume, often implicitly, that all legislatures, and, for that matter, the decision-making process, are centralized under parliamentarism and decentralized under presidentialism.

The English parliament is indeed characterized by the complete control of the cabinet over the legislative agenda. Government bills are appreciated under a special calendar that gives them priority over bills introduced by individual members of parliament and, as a consequence, parliamentary minorities have no way to "close the gates" to governmental proposals. In addition, individual members of parliament are often restricted in their capacity to amend government bills. For instance, since the beginning of the eighteenth century the government has had the sole prerogative to initiate measures that increase expenditures (Lowenberg & Patterson 1979, p. 249). Nowadays, it is rare for the budget presented by the cabinet to be modified by the parliament. In fact, given the high expectations that it will be approved as submitted, "a provisional resolution places it into effect on the day it is delivered, though months may pass before its final enactment" (Lowenberg & Patterson 1979, p. 250).

Because of the government's control over the agenda, legislative output is marked by a high rate of success for the executive's initiatives. Proposals made by the cabinet had a 0.97 chance of

being approved during the 1945--1978 period, whereas bills introduced by back-benchers, irrespective of their party affiliation, had a close-to-zero chance of being approved (Rose 1986, p. 11). This means that the cabinet introduces almost all laws that are approved in parliament. The government legislative success rests on disciplined party support. Cabinet defeats are rare events. The cabinet entirely monopolizes the law-making process and, for that matter, all the decisions about policy.

The US congress, in contrast, is supposed to be a decentralized body, organized as it is around a strong committee system. In this view, the committee system allows legislators to have a say in decisions related to policy areas that are important to their electoral survival. The story goes like this. Each committee has a monopoly on initiating legislation in its own policy jurisdiction. The committee reports a bill to the floor and, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the floor accepts the bill as reported [see the debate between Kriebhel (1987) and Shepsle & Weingast (1987)]. Political parties do not control the assignment of legislators to specific committees; this is described as a process of self-selection in which legislators pick the committee that has jurisdiction over the policy area that will bring them the highest electoral payoff. At the same time, electoral considerations dictate that politicians prefer distributive, pork-barrel policies. The committee system in the US congress provides the organizational means to make these distributive policies possible. This textbook (Shepsle 1989) view of the US congress has been challenged by Kriebhel (1992) and Cox & McCubbins (1993), to cite only the most important works. Yet, it is true that even in the informational and the party-as-a-cartel views, the committee system is a key and distinctive feature of the US congress.

Hence, with England as the prototype of executive-legislative relations in parliamentary regimes and the United States as the prototypical presidential system, it follows that “[i]n parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls the agenda, and the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential systems the legislature makes the proposal and the executive (the president) signs or vetoes them” (Tsebelis 1995, p. 325). The prototypical parliamentary regime is one in which the government has complete control over the legislative agenda; the rights of the individual members of parliament are “expropriated” and monopolized by the cabinet. Hence, all individual legislators can do is to support the party line. Voters know that this is all they can do, and thus have no incentive to cast their ballot on the basis of the candidate’s personal characteristics. Through the control of the legislative agenda, therefore, parliamentarism would lead to party vote in the electorate and to party discipline in the parliament.¹⁰

¹⁰ High rates of executive success and low participation of individual members in law-making are, indeed, characteristic of most parliamentary regimes. The data assembled by the Inter Parliamentary Union (Herman & Mendel 1976), covering 14 countries with parliamentary regimes during the 1971--1976 period, register only 3 in which government legislative success is below 80%. There is no case in which individual initiatives represent more than 20% of the laws passed. For three countries (Australia, Ireland, and Malta), there is no case of a bill introduced by an individual legislator that became a law. For the period 1978--1982, Herman & Mendel (1986) register 3 out of 16 countries with government success below 80% and only 3 with individual members’ initiatives above 20% (Austria, Italy, and Portugal).

The prototype of a presidential regime, in turn, is one in which the organization of congress preserves the right of individual representatives to have a say on policy decisions. Separation of powers leads to independent legislators who act on the basis of their individual electoral needs, and in response to these needs, they build personal ties with their constituencies. One is thus led to expect that legislatures in presidential regimes will have strong committee systems and representatives will be elected on the basis of the personal ties they build with their constituencies.

But, as we have known at least since Shugart & Carey published *Presidents and Assemblies* (1992), presidential systems vary considerably in the degree of legislative powers they grant the president. The US president, as a matter of fact, is one of the few presidents in existing systems who cannot initiate legislation. Moreover, the US president only has the package veto, which weakens his capacity to oppose distributive bargains produced in congress. Hence, the US presidency is unique in that the president has only “reactive legislative powers” (Mainwaring & Shugart 1997b). Not only are presidents often endowed with the capacity to initiate legislation; often they also have the exclusive right to initiate legislation in some areas (such as appropriation and budgetary matters), whereas legislators are restricted in their capacity to amend bills in these areas. Hence, contrary to Tsebelis (1995), presidents can do much more than simply sign or veto bills proposed by the legislature.

In addition, some presidents also have decree power; they are constitutionally able to unilaterally alter the status quo. Although there is considerable variation in the specifics (Carey & Shugart 1998), often presidential decrees enter into effect first and the legislature acts second. The legislature acts a posteriori, rejecting, amending, or accepting the new status quo brought about by the executive decree.¹¹ A president with decree power can dictate the legislative agenda by forcing the legislature to make a decision on some matter it could not have appreciated otherwise. Thus, no group in the legislature, not even the majority, can “close the gates” against a presidential initiative made by decree.

Note that the power to impose an agenda does not imply that presidents always prevail against the will of the majority. In fact, since a legislative majority can always reject a presidential decree, a model of executive-legislative conflict cannot explain why the executive would ever make use of decrees (Huber 1996a). There are, of course, strategic advantages that the agenda setter may explore. But as Kriebhel (1988, p. 270) has argued, these are not properly anti-majoritarian devices.¹²

¹¹ Often, rejection of a presidential decree does not mean a return to the status quo ante. Even if there is a majority in favor of the status quo, once the decree has been in effect, rejecting it may have become an unattractive or unavailable alternative.

¹² It is true that, since a decree immediately alters the status quo, decree power increases the power of the agenda setter. When legislatures vote on ordinary propositions, legislators compare the status quo (SQ) with the situation to be created by the proposition. In the case of an executive decree, the legislator compares the situation created by the decree (D) with the new situation created by rejecting a decree that has been in effect for some time (SQD). If the preferences of the majority are $SQ > D > SQD$, then the majority will approve the decree. If the preferences of the majority are $SQD > D$ (assuming that SQ is no longer a viable alternative), then the majority will reject the decree.

In addition, the government's legislative and agenda powers, including decree power, need not be interpreted solely as means for solving "vertical" conflicts, that is, conflicts between the government and the opposition. The government's legislative powers are also means for solving "horizontal" conflicts, that is, conflicts between the government and its supporters (Huber 1996a). These powers enable the government to protect the cohesion of its coalition against the opportunistic behavior of its members.¹³

It follows from this that, because of presidents' legislative powers, separation of powers in presidential regimes is not as complete as it is usually considered to be. Presidential legislative powers are commonly interpreted in the context of the US constitution, that is, as means to create checks and balances. But, as we have just seen, the legislative powers of the executive are not only a mechanism for checking the power of the majority or imposing the will of the president. They are also weapons of the majority. Therefore, the fusion of executive and legislative powers is not absent from presidential systems.

This interpretation is at odds with Shugart & Carey's (1992) view, according to which presidential systems that endow presidents with considerable legislative powers---creating what Shugart & Carey call strong presidents---have a? greater probability of breaking down. They argue that strong presidents have smaller incentives to negotiate with congress, making paralysis and crisis more likely. This is so because strong presidents have the institutional means to impose their will on congress, whereas weak presidents know that they have no alternative but to negotiate. This argument, however, is based on the "vertical conflict" model and disregards the possibility that the president will try to organize a majority in congress. Once the possibility that the president and the majority have overlapping preferences is considered, then legislative agenda powers need not imply paralysis, crisis, and eventual breakdown.

The organization of congress and the degree of control the executive has over the legislative agenda does influence the behavior of individual legislators. They act in a constrained environment. If they want to influence policy, they have to do so according to the procedural rules of their legislative body and the terms set by the president. For example, the incentives to cultivate the personal vote that stem from the electoral arena may be entirely neutralized in the legislature through a distribution of legislative rights that favors the executive. For this reason, we cannot deduce, as is commonly done, the behavior of legislators from electoral and party legislation alone.

In this context, the case of Brazil is of central theoretical interest, for it demonstrates the far-reaching effects of the centralization of the decision-making process. The system produced by the 1988 constitution is frequently cited as a prime example of bad institutional design (Ames 2001). All of the institutional choices that should not be made, it seems, were made in 1988: a strong presidential regime [ranked among the strongest in the world by Shugart & Carey (1992, p. 155)]; a proportional representation formula for legislative elections with high district

¹³ There seems to be no association between minority status and the use of decree power (Figueiredo & Limongi 1998).

magnitude; very permissive party and electoral legislation (e.g., open-list and low party control over access to the ballot). Under such conditions, the party system is bound to be fragmented and presidents can be virtually certain that their party will not control a majority of seats in both legislative houses. Even if it did, parties would be highly undisciplined, making the majority status of the president a mere formality (Sartori 1994, p. 113; Mainwaring 1991). Hence, to have their agenda approved, presidents would use their strong legislative powers, which would lead to conflict and paralysis. To paraphrase Sartori (1997), the system created in 1988 was nothing but hopeless.

Yet, the performance of the post-1988 Brazilian regime is completely at odds with what we would expect. Brazilian presidents of this period have had great success enacting their legislative agenda. Presidents introduced 86% of the bills enacted since 1988 and the rate of approval of the bills introduced by the executive was 78%. Presidents have formed coalitions to govern and have reliably obtained the support of the parties that belong to the government coalition in approving its legislation; the average discipline of the presidential coalition, defined as the act of voting in accordance with the public recommendation of the government leader in the floor, was 85.6%. This support is sufficient to make a presidential defeat in a roll call a rare event. Thus, despite the “centrifugal” characteristics of Brazilian presidentialism, as indicated by the party and electoral legislation, presidents have governed relying on the support of a disciplined coalition (Figueiredo & Limongi 2000).

This outcome results from both the organization of the Brazilian congress and the president’s control of the legislative agenda. The Brazilian congress is highly centralized. Legislative rights heavily favor party leaders, who are taken to be perfect agents of their caucuses (*bancadas*) regarding most procedural decisions, such as the request for roll-call votes, the closing of debates, and, most important, the designation of a bill as urgent for purposes of appreciation. The urgency request is a kind of discharge petition: it removes the bill from the committee and forces its immediate (within 24 hours) deliberation by the floor. Bills that are appreciated as urgent cannot be freely amended; only amendments signed by 20% of the lower house are accepted, which implies that only amendments supported by party leaders will be considered. As Figueiredo & Limongi (2000, p. 157) have shown, the approval of the urgency petition is highly associated with the success of a bill. Centralization, thus, deprives members of congress of the legislative rights they need in order to influence legislation.

The Brazilian presidents, thanks to their constitutional legislative powers, have a direct influence on the definition of the legislative agenda. Using its decree power, the executive places on the agenda the issues it deems most relevant and pressing. The president can also influence the pace of ordinary legislation by requesting urgency for the appreciation of specific bills (which will give each house 45 days to deliberate on them). The president also has the exclusive right to initiate legislation related to the definition of the budget, taxation, and public administration. Therefore, the executive monopolizes the legislative initiative on the most crucial areas of policy making.

Hence, it is through participation in the government that individual legislators obtain access to resources they need for political survival: policy influence and patronage. Leaders bargain with

the executive, exchanging political support (votes) for access to policy influence and patronage. The executive thus provides party leaders with the means to punish back-benchers who do not follow the party line: Their share of patronage may be denied. The executive, in turn, given the resources it controls, is in a very advantageous position. Party leaders become, in fact, the main brokers in the bargaining between the executive and the legislators. Contrary to what is currently assumed about Brazil, presidents do not need to bargain on a case-by-case basis. They are in a position to demand support for their entire legislative agenda. Once the government is formed and benefits are distributed among the members of the coalition, the president, with the help of party leaders, may threaten representatives and actually punish those who do not follow the party line. To say it once more, the actual pattern of legislative-executive relations in Brazil's presidential regime is rather different from what one would expect if one deduced it from electoral and partisan legislation.

It should be clear by now that separation of powers does not necessarily imply decentralized decision making. Institutional analyses that stress the negative effects of separation of powers, and that point to specific, often restrictive, electoral laws as a corrective for these effects, miss the point. Presidentialism does not necessarily imply, or require, decentralized decision making and conflict between the executive and the legislature. Once one grants the possibility that coalition governments exist in presidential regimes, the degree of overlap between the executive and legislative majorities has to be adjusted.

Presidential control over the agenda becomes a weapon to be used by the majority rather than against the majority. Thus, presidents are not necessarily as distinct from prime ministers as is normally assumed. As we showed above, outcomes that are usually associated exclusively with parliamentarism, such as executive success and dominance over the legislative output obtained through disciplined parties, can be found even in "hopeless" presidential regimes such as Brazil's.

Now, just as presidential regimes are not all alike, neither are parliamentary systems. Government control over the legislative agenda does not follow from the definition of parliamentarism. Neither is it necessary that the legislative rights of private members be curtailed in parliamentary regimes. Committees may have considerable powers in parliamentary assemblies and may erect barriers to the executive agenda.¹⁴ The weakness of individual members of parliament that characterizes England is not inherent to parliamentary governments, as illustrated by the cases of Italy after 1945 and France in the Third and Fourth Republics. In both cases, the government had no control over the definition of the legislative agenda, committees had considerable power, and the rights of individual legislators were not "expropriated."

In France, until 1911, it was the Chamber presidents who defined the legislative agenda. As Andrews (1978) reports, after this date, a Conference of Presidents assumed control over the

¹⁴ One of the variables used by Strom (1990) to explain the formation of minority governments in parliamentary regimes was the committee structure of parliaments. Obviously there must exist some variation in this structure.

definition of the agenda. The government was represented in the Conference, but it was only in 1955 that internal rules were revised so that voting in the Conference of Presidents was weighted by the proportion of seats held by each party. The proposed agendas had to be approved by the Chamber, and this “often became an occasion for a vote of non-confidence through a device called ‘interpellation’” (Andrews 1978, p. 471). Hence, the government did not have firm control over the definition of the legislative agenda. On several occasions, interpellation led to judgment on the government agenda that caused the fall of the government.

Besides, committees could act as “veto players,” since a report from the committee was necessary for consideration of a bill by the floor. The government could expedite the committee report but could not avoid it. Therefore, committees could respond to government pressure with an unsatisfactory report. According to Andrews (1978), the Third and Fourth Republics placed few restrictions on the ability of private members to propose initiatives that would increase expenditures and reduce revenues. In his words, given the absence of serious restrictions, the government’s financial projects were often “butchered in parliament” (Andrews 1978, p. 485).

In Italy one finds the same pattern: the parliament’s independence to set the legislative agenda, strong committees, and legislative rights that favor individual members’ influence over decisions. In the Italian parliament, the presidents of each house, and not the government, define the legislative agenda. Bills introduced by the government have no special calendar or precedence over private members’ bills. Article 72 of the Italian constitution grants standing committees the authority to pass laws. This capacity has been widely used. According to Di Palma (1976), the presidents of both houses decide unilaterally whether a bill will have to be considered by the floor. Di Palma labels these alternatives the centralized and the decentralized procedures. Bills scheduled for the decentralized procedure have a much greater chance of becoming laws. Hence, all a president must do in order to “kill” a governmental proposition is to schedule it for the centralized procedure.

Besides being endowed with the power to pass legislation, Italian committees cannot be discharged when a bill follows the decentralized procedure. Although possible, discharges under the centralized procedure are rarely enforced. The committee chairmen are autonomous in defining their agendas and even in convening their committees. Therefore, committees not only are important decision-making bodies but also can act as veto players. As for individual members of parliament, until the 1988 reform, roll calls were secret and could be easily requested at any stage of the law-making process (Cotta 1990, p. 77). Hence, the government fell prey to the action of the *franco attiratori*. In other words, members of the majority could not be sanctioned, either by the government or their parties.

These are obviously not examples of parliamentary regimes performing at their best. In fact, both systems are often cited as examples of pathological development of parliamentarism, and both have been considerably reformed. But this only emphasizes our point: The instability of these systems resulted not from the form of government but from the way decision making was organized. Although policy performance is important for the survival of a democratic regime, we cannot deduce it from the basic constitutional principle that defines the regime. Policy making under parliamentarism is not necessarily centralized, and consequently the government is not

always successful in having its policy proposals approved. Similarly, policy making under presidentialism is not necessarily decentralized, and the government is not invariably immobilized in terms of the policies it can implement.

7. Accounting for Regime Survival

I started with the fact that presidential regimes are more brittle than parliamentary regimes. What has been said so far suggests that this is not due to the alleged consequences that follow from the principles that distinguish the two regimes. So, what causes the higher level of instability of presidential regimes?

I am convinced that *at least part* of the answer lies on the difference between them in the way the decision-making process is organized. Lack of coordination on policy-making and the probability of deadlock increase with the decentralization of the decision-making process. More often than not, we find parliamentary regimes that have a centralized decision-making process, one in which the executive has the monopoly over the policy agenda. This, however, as the Italian and French cases demonstrate, is not a necessary feature of parliamentarism. And, as the case of Brazil demonstrates, executive-legislative relations in the presence of political parties may generate an unexpected fusion of powers in presidential regimes. Presidents with active legislative powers do not have to impose their will over the congress and generate conflict; they can bargain from a very advantageous position with legislative majorities that frequently encompass more than one political party. Agenda powers and other institutional devices that centralize the decision-making process may be the basis for the efficiency of presidential regimes. Thus, if parliamentary regimes have a better record of survival than presidential regimes, it is not because they are parliamentary.

The question that immediately arises is why is it that we find more parliamentary regimes that are centralized and presidential regimes that are not as centralized? One reason is that the countries that first adopted presidential institutions (many of which in the 19th century), emulated the only presidential country that existed in the world, the United States which, as we know, happened to have an extremely decentralized decision-making processes, with a weak president and a strong legislature.

But once basic constitutional choices are made, they are hard to change. Indeed, democracies that have changed their form of government are rare. There are only four cases of such change in the world since 1946: Brazil in 1961 and 1963, France in 1958 and Armenia in 1995. Changes are more frequent when they follow an authoritarian interregnum, but even then they are not widespread: 32 countries in the world had the opportunity to restore at least once a democratic regime that had previously existed since 1946. In 66% of these the form of government that existed prior to the authoritarian regime was restored. And these do not include the cases in which new democracies adopt forms of government that prevailed under non-democratic constitutions. Thus, for reasons that are not entirely clear, democratic institutions are sticky. It may have to do with the fact that earlier institutions serve as a focal point in the process of constitution making. When Argentina invoked the 1853 constitution every one of the four times it democratized since the early 1960s, it “automatically” got with it a presidential form of

government, as well as a number of other institutions. Thus, we have to be careful when we use the language of institutional *choice*.

Fears stemming from the fact that many new democracies have “chosen” presidentialism are unfounded. To begin with, presidentialism is not the regime of choice of countries that either entered the world or became a democracy after 1946. Of the 156 cases in which some “choice” of democratic institutions was made since then, 45.5% adopted parliamentary institutions, 39.7% adopted presidential institutions, and 14.7% adopted mixed institutions. In 1946 there were 59 democracies in the world, 30.5% of which had pure presidential institutions. In 1999 there were 109 democracies in the world, 32% of which were presidential. Thus, the proportion of democracies that are presidential did not increase in any significant way since 1946. The biggest expansion took place among countries that adopted mixed institutions, which existed in 3.4% of democracies in 1946 and 19.3% in 1999. These are regimes in which governments are accountable both to the legislature and to an independently elected president. But the fact that these are systems also have a president should not make us jump to the conclusion that they are similar to presidential regimes in the way they operate. Everything we know about these regimes, and this is not very much (Eligie 1999, Cheibub 2002) suggests that they are unique in many respects. But the point is that there is no evidence that new democracies have tended to adopt pure presidential institutions more frequently than parliamentary or mixed institutions.

Equally important is the fact that, even when pure presidential institutions are adopted or restored, the new constitutions contain significant changes which may be sufficient to fundamentally alter the way the system works. Note that, in many countries, the presidential democracies that have been reestablished since the 1980s have already outlasted their earlier democratic periods. The constitutions that were reestablished in many of these countries are presidential, but they are not the same kind of presidential constitution that existed before. Thus, if the Brazilian 1988 constitution (broadly conceived) looks very much like the 1946 constitution – presidential, federal, bicameral, with open-list proportional representation elections for the lower house of congress, overrepresentation of smaller states – it differs from it in the power it grants the president to shape the legislative agenda.¹⁵ Thus, the type of presidentialism that is being adopted in many countries is not the same presidentialism that existed before, or that exists in the US. These changes have nothing to do with foreign models. They are, in a large measure, the product of authoritarian extrication and/or of interpretations of the crisis that led to the breakdown of democracy in the first place. Thus, Elkins (2001) entirely misses the point when he attributes the “choice” of presidentialism in Brazil in 1988 to the influence of the United States “model”.

It is possible, therefore, that presidential regimes have just become more resilient in their new incarnation. This, however, can only be part of the story, for we also need to consider *conditions*, the environment in which institutions have to operate. That conditions are important is not

¹⁵ See Figueiredo and Limongi (2001) for a comparison of the 1946-64 and post-1988 periods. The analysis starts from the fact that between the two periods, everything remained the same, except for the powers of the president and the way congress was organized. She shows how different the outcomes in the two periods were. Similar changes, that is, changes in the direction of centralization of decision-making, can also be observed in the constitutions of other new democracies (Siavelis 2000).

controversial. Disagreements arise when we try to specify which are the relevant ones. Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) suggest that the difference in performance may have to do with location (presidential regimes appear in Latin America and Africa, parliamentary regimes in Europe) and country size (parliamentary regimes appear in small countries). Level of economic development is by far the most contemplate alternative: presidential regimes appear in poorer countries, democracies are more unstable in poorer countries, hence, presidential democracies are more unstable. But these do not seem to be good candidates. Location cannot be considered an explanation for it begs the question about what is it that really matters. As for per capita income, descriptive patterns (Table 5) show that, except for very poor countries, presidential democracies face considerably higher risks of death than parliamentary democracies at every income level. In countries where per capita income is very low – under \$1,000 1985 PPP\$ – parliamentary democracies face higher risks. But in these cases risks are high for all regimes: expected lives are 7 and 9 years, respectively, for parliamentary and presidential democracies.

*** Table 5 here ***

Short-term economic performance also matters for the survival of democratic regimes, but it does not explain why presidential democracies die more frequently than parliamentary ones. As a matter of fact, as Table 6 shows, parliamentary democracies are highly sensitive to per capita income growth: when the economy is growing, they can expect to live 56 years; when the economy is stagnant or in decline, their expected life reduces to 24 years. This effect is weaker in presidential regimes: it reduces the expected life of the democracy by only 7 years. However, the expected life of presidential democracies when the economy is doing well – 29 years – is not that much better than the expected life of parliamentary democracies when the economy is doing poorly – 24 years.

*** Table 6 here ***

There are, of course, several other non-institutional factors that may matter for the survival of parliamentary and presidential democracies. Assume, to consider just one, that the military have a preference for presidential over parliamentary democracies. Faced with the inevitability of a transition to democracy they may prefer the stability and concentration of authority in the office of the presidency over the explicitly partisan, contentious and precarious existence of parliamentary governments. Thus, democracies that emerge out of military dictatorships are more likely to be presidential than parliamentary. These democracies, in turn, have to contend with a relatively strong or autonomous military who may display a relatively high propensity to intervene in politics. If this is the case, it may be possible that presidential democracies are fragile not because they are presidential, but because they tend to emerge in countries where the military are likely to intervene in politics and hence impose a non-democratic regime. In this situation, what kills presidential democracy is not presidentialism but the relatively high propensity toward military intervention in the countries where presidentialism emerges.

If we keep in mind the difficulties of coding the political influence of the military,¹⁶ the evidence that exists suggests that this story is, at least, plausible. Military dictatorships, which are coded as such if the effective head of the government is a member of the military hierarchy, are much more unstable than civilian dictatorships. At any given year civilian dictatorships die at the rate of 1 to 57, whereas military dictatorships die at the rate of 1 to 21. The probability that a military dictatorship will become a presidential democracy is almost twice as large as the probability that the same will happen with a civilian dictatorship: 0.6122 to 0.3548. Together these numbers suggest that the first part of the argument developed in the previous paragraph finds support in the data: presidential democracies are more often than parliamentary democracies the product of a military dictatorship.

At the same time, as Table 7 shows, the difference in survival probabilities between parliamentary and presidential regimes is either drastically reduced, or even reversed, once we control for the type of dictatorship that preceded the current democracy. Remember that the expected life of presidential democracies, irrespective of origin, is 27 years, versus 58 years for parliamentary democracies. When these regimes are preceded by civilian dictatorships the difference persists: expected life of 68 years for parliamentarism and 36 years for presidentialism. However, when these democracies are preceded by a military dictatorship we find that their expected lives are, respectively, 16 and 21 years. Thus, when democracies emerge from military dictatorships, the ones with parliamentary institutions are more likely to die than the ones with presidential institutions. The difference is not large; but it is in the opposite direction from what has been found so far.

*** Table 7 here ***

This pattern is not due to the fact that the data set includes a number of parliamentary democracies established prior to 1945, all of which emerged out of non-military dictatorships. As the second panel in table 7 shows, nothing changes when we restrict the analysis to the democratic regimes that emerged after 1945. Similarly, the result does not change when we restrict the analysis to the cases with per capita income below the level at which democracies become impregnable, that is, to the cases with per capita income below 6,055 1985 PPP\$ (Przeworski et al 2000). As the third panel of Table 7 shows, in this income range, parliamentary democracies that follow a military dictatorship can expect to live for 13 years, versus 18 years for presidential democracies.

*** Table 8 here ***

These results stand to statistical analysis. Table 8 reports the estimates of the impact of presidentialism on the survival of democracy. As we can see, presidential regimes negatively affect the survival of democracies, even after we control for per capita income and rates of economic growth. When the nature of the previous dictatorship is controlled for, however, the effect of presidentialism disappears, much as the descriptive patterns discussed above indicate. These conclusions remain unchanged if we assume different distributions, heterogeneity, or if we

¹⁶ See Gandhi and Przeworski (2001) for a description of the data.

estimate a non-parametric survival model. It seems, thus, that something about the societies in which presidential regimes emerge – that is, societies in which the military has a high propensity to intervene in politics – makes them more brittle. In these societies, parliamentary and presidential regimes are both at least equally unstable.

Conclusion

I tried to argue in this paper that, even though we observe significant differences between parliamentary and presidential democracies when it comes to survival, these differences cannot be attributed to the principles that define these regimes. There is no question in my mind that the choice between parliamentarism and presidentialism is an important one. What is not clear is that one regime is unambiguously superior to the other, both normatively, a claim that I did not address in the paper, or empirically, a claim which I hope to have provided sufficient evidence to support. I argued that the very notion of a choice of institutions has to be reconsidered: institutions in general, but in particular democratic institutions, are sticky and one of the relevant questions is to consider whether countries that are dealt a particular set of institutions are less likely to succeed. There is nothing inherent to presidentialism that makes democracies that adopt it doomed to fail. The difference in the survival of parliamentary and presidential regimes cannot be explained by the structure of incentives that supposedly follows from the regime's basic principles. Parliamentary systems do not operate under a "majoritarian imperative"; deadlock is not as frequent as supposed under presidentialism and is not absent from parliamentarism; coalition governments are not foreign to presidential systems and emerge for reasons that are similar to the ones that make them appear in parliamentary systems; decision making is not always centralized under parliamentarism and is not always decentralized under presidentialism. The reality of both parliamentary and presidential regimes is more complex than what is implied by simply deriving these systems' entire behavior from their first principles.

I also have argued that non-institutional factors matter when we try to account for democratic survival. I showed that economic conditions per se – level and growth of per capita income – are not sufficient to account for the difference between the survival rates of parliamentary and presidential regimes. The nature of the authoritarian regime that preceded democracy significantly affects the survival odds of these democracies, regardless of the kind of democratic institutions they adopted. This certainly does not exhaust the possibilities of non-institutional determinants of political outcomes. But it suggests that today an institutionalist explanation cannot anymore commit some of the excesses that were tolerated when the research agenda consisted of showing that institutions do matter. The issue today is not whether they matter or not. Rather, it is *how* they matter, given the conditions under which they exist.

TABLE 1 Minority presidents, deadlock situations, and transition probabilities in presidential regimes by type of legislature, effective number of political parties, electoral system, and timing of elections (source: Cheibub 2002)

	% Minority Presidents^a (N)	Deadlock Situations^b (N)	Transition Probabilities^c
All	40.22 (726)	33.52 (710)	0.0395
Type of Legislature:			
Unicameral	36.46 (277)	29.67 (273)	0.0464
Bicameral	42.54 (449)	35.96 (437)	0.0353
Electoral System:			
Majority-plurality	39.04 (146)	36.99 (146)	0.0482
Pure proportional	39.42 (553)	32.96 (540)	0.0378
Pure prop. + mixed	40.52 (580)	32.62 (564)	0.0372
Effective Number of Parties (ENP):			
ENP≤2	35.33 (150)	27.33 (150)	0.0458
2<ENP≤3	33.45 (281)	31.49 (280)	0.0209
3<ENP≤4	59.69 (129)	49.22 (128)	0.0714
4<ENP≤5	28.17 (71)	28.17 (71)	0.0417
ENP>5	50.60 (83)	32.10 (81)	0.0111
Timing of Legislative and Presidential Elections:			
Non-concurrent	45.16 (124)	40.32 (124)	0.0318
Alternate	66.92 (133)	47.11 (121)	0.0548
Non-conc. + alternate	56.42 (257)	43.67 (245)	0.0429
Concurrent	31.34 (469)	28.17 (465)	0.0374
Political Conditions			
Minority presidents			0.0462
Majority presidents			0.0293
Minority governments ^d			0.0392
Majority governments ^d			0.0377
Deadlock situations			0.0378
No deadlock situations			0.0318

^a“Minority presidents” include the cases in which the party of the president does not control >50% of the seats in the legislature in a unicameral system; or where it does not control >50% of the seats in at least one of the chambers in a bicameral system.

^b“Deadlock situations” are defined by the number of seats held by the government, by whether presidents can veto legislation, by the requirements for legislative override of the presidential veto, by the legislative structure, and by whether, in bicameral systems, veto override is by a vote in each house or by a joint session of both houses.

^c“Transition probabilities” indicate the probability that a presidential regime will become a dictatorship (the number of transitions away from presidentialism divided by the number of cases of presidentialism).

^d“Minority” and “majority” governments are defined by the share of legislative seats held by all the parties that hold cabinet positions.

Table 2				
Coalitions and Majorities as a Function of Fractionalization				
	Parliamentarism		Presidentialism	
Plurality Seat Share	Coalitions	Majorities	Coalitions	Majorities
# 0.5	0.7809	0.6184	0.5361	0.3196
0.33-0.5	0.6808	0.5962	0.4493	0.3043
# 0.33	0.9286	0.6857	0.7500	0.3571

Table 3		
Relative Size of the Party of the Chief Executive in the Legislature		
	Prime Ministers	Presidents
Largest	0.8518	0.7429
Second	0.0974	0.1850
Largest + Second	0.9492	0.9279
Third	0.0313	0.0549
Fourth or Smaller	0.0195	0.0172

Table 4
Transition Probabilities by the Share of Seats Held by the Largest Party
and the Effective Number of Political Parties

	All	Parliamentary	Presidential
Seats Held by the Largest Party:			
Over 50%	0.0251	0.0139	0.0475
No Coalition	0.0266	0.0137	0.0516
Coalition	0.0143	0.0159	0.0000
Under 50%	0.0254	0.0191	0.0429
No Coalition	0.0301	0.0253	0.0408
Coalition	0.0172	0.0114	0.0443
33.3%-50%	0.0222	0.0131	0.0555
No Coalition	0.0307	0.0265	0.0407
Coalition	0.0178	0.0071	0.0753
Under 33.3 %	0.0170	0.0197	0.0224
No Coalition	0.0256	0.0000	0.0417
Coalition	0.0161	0.0206	0.0182
Effective Number of Parties:			
Less than 2.5	0.0267	0.0167	0.0480
No Coalition	0.0308	0.0192	0.0532
Coalition	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
2.5-less than 3.5	0.0170	0.0121	0.0325
No Coalition	0.0230	0.0165	0.0291
Coalition	0.0117	0.0087	0.0392
3.5-less than 4.5	0.0292	0.0094	0.0886
No Coalition	0.0127	0.0000	0.0385
Coalition	0.0342	0.0121	0.1132
More than or equal to 4.5	0.0163	0.0140	0.0390
No Coalition	0.0278	0.0000	0.0555
Coalition	0.0148	0.0148	0.0339
Conditions Under Moderate and High Party fragmentation (Effective Parties):			
		3.5 - 4.5	More than 4.5
Majority Government		0.5760	0.5719
Coalition Government		0.7690	0.8824
Party of Head of Government is the Largest Party		0.6569	0.5085
Share of Seats of Party of the Head of Government		0.3361	0.2319
Share of Seats of Largest Party		0.3809	0.2845
Share of Seats of Second Largest Party		0.2512	0.2049
Share of Seats of Third Largest Party		0.1600	0.1523
Sum of Seat Share of First, Second and Third Parties		0.7921	0.6417
Sum of Seat Share of Second and Third Parties		0.4112	0.3573

Source: Cheibub et al (2001).

Table 5
Transition Probabilities in Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies by Real Per Capita Income (1985 PPP\$)

Per Capita Income	All	Parliamentary	Presidential
≤ 1,000	0.1190	0.1413	0.1026
1,001-2,000	0.0476	0.0415	0.0558
2,001-3,000	0.0292	0.0072	0.0400
3,001-4,000	0.0224	0.0270	0.0208
4,001-5,000	0.0126	0.0000	0.0435
5,001-6,000	0.0068	0.0000	0.0357
6,001-7,000	0.0062	0.0000	0.0278
≥ 7,000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
All	0.0238	0.0174	0.0375

Table 6
Transition Probabilities in Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies by Annual Growth of Real Per Capita Income (1985 PPP\$)

	All	Parliamentary	Presidential
Growth ≤ 0	0.0410	0.0352	0.0457
Growth > 0	0.0179	0.0121	0.0339

Table 7
Transition Probabilities in Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies by the Type
of the Previous Dictatorship

All Democracies:			
Previous Dictatorship	All	Parliamentary	Presidential
Civilian	0.0174	0.0148	0.0281
Military	0.0471	0.0617	0.0467
Post-1945 Democracies			
Previous Dictatorship	All	Parliamentary	Presidential
Civilian	0.0275	0.0252	0.0378
Military	0.0502	0.0617	0.0442
Per Capita Income \geq 6,055 1985 PPP\$			
Previous Dictatorship	All	Parliamentary	Presidential
Civilian	0.0330	0.0305	0.0398
Military	0.0588	0.0746	0.0554

Table 8
Impact of Presidentialism on the Survival of Democracies

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Presidentialism	-0.4169 (0.0152)	-0.3430 (0.1418)	-0.3321 (0.1426)	-0.0086 (0.1554)
Per Capita Income		0.614E-04 (0.186E-04)	0.726E-04 (0.180E-04)	0.642E-04 (0.178E-04)
Growth of Per Capita Income			-0.0044 (0.0015)	-0.0045 (0.0015)
Military Origin				-0.7550 (0.1767)
Constant	3.1871 (0.1045)	2.8907 (0.1193)	2.8332 (0.1198)	2.9795 (0.1242)
Log-Likelihood Function	-616.9905	-614.5196	-611.4853	-604.4538
P	0.8919 (0.0643)	0.9773 (0.0876)	1.0118 (0.0937)	1.0644 (0.0959)

Dependent variable is the log of age (in years) of democratic regimes For each variable, the first row is the estimated coefficient of a Weibull survival model, the second is the standard error.

Figure 1: Minority Situations and Government Outcom
in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems





Figure 2: Share of Seats of Party of PM and President



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